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strategic thought, in both academe and
the policy world. The second chapter
addresses both the strengths and weaknesses of “new security” thinking in academe in the 1990s. This chapter could
be of particular value to political scientists and international relations
specialists.
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of
this section should be required reading
for the modern war fighter and other
practitioners. These sections focus on
the importance of seapower and maritime strategy, on the enormous complexities involved in making strategy,
and on the paradoxes inherent in the
principles of war and in efforts to adapt
them to the changing international environment. Gray notes that the principles of war are actually principles of
warfare—intimately connected with the
tactical and operational levels of war
but remote from the fundamental issue
of waging war to achieve political ends.
The second and third sections do not
quite achieve the high standards of the
first. The second section’s focus on nuclear strategy, on the RMA debate, and
on arms control may seem antiquated
to today’s reader. Nevertheless, the notions that the RMA debate failed to
consider adversary responses to American technological superiority and that
arms control “is as likely to fuel political antagonism as prevent or alleviate
it” still have relevance to policy today.
The third section’s first chapter notes
the salient impact of geography on
strategy—an obvious point, perhaps,
but one exemplified most recently by
the problems of carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign in an Iraq with
insecure land borders on all sides. The
third chapter is a laudable effort to explain morality and ethics in international
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relations from the viewpoint of a neoclassical realist. The middle chapter, on
strategic culture, is the most daring,
and in some respects the most disappointing. Gray attempts to make a very
complex argument regarding the definition of strategic culture, but much of
the chapter is focused on a debate with
Iain Johnston, which readers unfamiliar
with this literature may find particularly daunting. This unusual chapter,
however, does not detract from the
overall value of the volume, which is
excellent not only as an introduction to
those unfamiliar with the study of strategy but also as a useful addition to the
libraries of practitioners, academics,
and military officers.
TIMOTHY D. HOYT

Naval War College

Haqqani, Husain. Pakistan: Between Mosque and
Military. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. 380pp.
$17.95

Five years into the U.S.-led global war
on terror, Pakistan remains a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in defeating the
Taliban and rooting out al-Qa‘ida. Despite the importance of Pakistan, it is a
country that poses challenges for the
United States. A key challenge is the
dominant role of the military, which
seeks to balance its commitments as a
valuable U.S. partner with its role as
a guardian of the country’s Islamic
identity through its close relationship
with Pakistan’s religious establishment.
How Pakistan manages these commitments has serious implications for U.S.
policy. Fortunately, Husain Haqqani
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has come to our aid to help us understand this complex political dynamic.
Haqqani has an insider’s view of Pakistani politics, having served as an adviser to three prime ministers, a
diplomat, a political commentator, and
a scholar of South Asian politics at the
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. This experience well qualifies
him to guide the reader through the
complex and, at times, confusing relationship between the Pakistan military,
the civil bureaucracy, and the religious
establishment.
Haqqani chronicles the early struggles
for Pakistan’s formation and makes a
convincing case that the lack of a clear
vision for Pakistan’s identity in the
early period of independence opened
the door for the military, the civil bureaucracy, and Islamic ideologues to
play dominant roles in Pakistan’s political culture. The largely secular ruling
establishment acknowledged Islam as
the symbol of unity but did not define
how Islam would manifest itself within
society. What were the limits (if any)
on religion in politics? How would relations between Muslims and other religious groups be managed if Islam was
the defining idea of Pakistan? Whose
interpretation of Islam would dominate
the new country? Questions such as
these were never confronted; the new
leadership was too preoccupied with
others, such as establishing a government, developing an economy, raising
an army, and developing a civil
bureaucracy.
Haqqani explains how the inability of
Pakistan’s founders to delineate Islam’s
place in society turned the faith into a
political tool for successive military and
civilian leaders. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s secular civilian prime minister
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in the 1970s, began the cynical employment of Islam in politics by attempting
to cross it with socialism. It was Bhutto’s
courting of the Muslim clergy with “Islamic socialism” that opened the door
into politics for Pakistan’s religious
establishment.
Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq, a man of strong religious
convictions. During his eleven-year rule
he transformed Pakistan’s identity
through a campaign of Islamization of
law and society. This process extended
throughout the military and spread to
the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, which came to be dominated by officers who believed in Zia’s aims. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided
Zia an opportunity to support selected
mujaheddin groups fighting the Soviets,
as long as they aligned with Zia’s religious views and vision for Afghanistan.
By the time Zia died in an unexplained
plane crash in 1988, Pakistan had, according to Haqqani, changed to an
“ideological state guided by a praetorian military.” The centers of power
were by now heavily Islamized, through
the influence of the religious establishment within the civil bureaucracy and
the military.
Haqqani argues that civilian leaders like
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could
not reverse the Islamization of Pakistani politics. Instead, both of these
leaders tried to coexist with a military
heavily influenced by the religious establishment. Both leaders failed, because they eventually ran afoul of the
influential military establishment that
believed they threatened its position of
power.
As he skillfully explains these dynamics,
Haqqani also weaves in their effect on
the United States–Pakistan relationship.
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During the first decade after its chaotic
birth, Pakistan sought to form a strategic alliance with the United States. The
bilateral relationship during the Cold
War was based on U.S. interest in a
strong anti-Soviet ally in Asia and Pakistan’s desire for backing against India.
This incongruence set up the two countries for misperceptions and unfulfilled
expectations that have lasted to the
present day.
The relationship was further complicated in the period after the Cold War
as U.S.-Pakistan ties frayed over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and
the Soviet threat disappeared. As the
United States began to scrutinize Pakistan more closely for democratic practices and nuclear proliferation, the
pro-American tilt within the Pakistani
military began to wane. A series of perceived slights (such as Washington’s refusal to deliver F-16 aircraft after
Pakistan had paid for them) and the effective cessation of the bilateral military
relationship contributed to this collective attitude. Although the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 resurrected
the relationship, it remains to be seen
whether the current bilateral cooperation can be sustained for the long term,
given the various pressures that the current president, General Pervez Musharraf,
is facing.
Haqqani ends the book with a chapter
that summarizes his findings and offers
suggestions for U.S. policy. Although
his diagnosis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is sound, we would benefit from
a bit more detail about some of his policy proposals. That is a minor shortcoming; Haqqani has provided an
excellent work on understanding the
nexus between Pakistan’s religious establishment and military, and on the
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implications of this relationship for Pakistan’s future.
AMER LATIF

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Director, South Asian Affairs

Brown, Malcolm, ed. T. E. Lawrence in War and
Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of
Lawrence of Arabia. London: Greenhill, 2005.
320pp. $39.95

This is a timely book. It is a collection
of rarely read wartime reports and post–
World War I articles that wrestle with
the consequences of war and were written by the British officer T. E. Lawrence,
otherwise known as Lawrence of Arabia, one of the greatest theoreticians
and practitioners of modern guerrilla
warfare.
Lawrence, of course, is best known for
his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
which describes the British-inspiredand-supported Arab revolt against their
Ottoman suzerain. Lawrence is back in
vogue again, which is not surprising
given the involvement of the United
States in a seemingly intractable and
protracted insurgency in Iraq. Many officers, officials, and academics are turning to The Seven Pillars of Wisdom for
nuggets of information about insurgency warfare, or, indeed, about the
Arabs themselves. In his foreword, Professor Michael Clarke of King’s College
London says that the book “has become
an oft-consulted work among military
officers presently struggling with the attempt to create order in Iraq.” The
Seven Pillars of Wisdom is wonderful
prose, but as Malcolm Brown puts it,
the work is “no pushover even for the
most adept of skim-readers.” It is in
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